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MODEL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAM FOR
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA
ANITA MORSE
International boundaries, historically, have been scenes of international conflict. The 3,500 mile Canadian-United States border
from Passamaquoddy Bay to Juan de Fuca Strait' was no different.
But then a series of diplomatic meetings2 resulted in the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909 establishing the International Joint Commission 3 for the peaceful solution of disputes. Increasing water poilution on an international scale has required extensive use of the Commission by both countries and now calls for the addition to the
Treaty of a model water resources program for the international
boundaries of the United States and Canada.
THE FEDERAL POWER PROBLEM
The assertion of federal dominance over natural resources in the

United States is a completed act. From a limited use of the interstate
commerce power in the 1800's in the field of navigation, the federal
legislature, executive, and judicial bodies have extended their
authority over the great bulk of our land, air, and water.

The President's power over foreign affairs has been used;" the war
powers;' control over federal proprietary interests;6 and, the great
catch all, the power to provide for the general welfare. 7 Supreme
Court judicial review played an important part in strengthening the
powers of the federal government. Decisions handed down on naviga1. Not to be forgotten is the Canadian-Alaskan border which extends approximately
1450 miles and which is crossed by numerous rivers.
2. L. Bloomfield and G. Fitzgerald, Boundary Water Problems of Canada and the United
States 1 (1968).
3. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising between
the United States and Canada (hereinafter cited as Boundary Waters Treaty), Jan. 11, 1909,
36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548.
4. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); Rio Grande Dam and
Irrigation Co. v. United States, 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
5. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 279 U.S. 288 (1925).
6. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955). The full impact of the
assertion of control over federal proprietary interests can be realized by the study of Tables
I-Ill, Acquisitions of the Public Domain; Disposition of Public Lands; and Federally Owned
Lands by States, Bureau of Land Management, Public Land Statistics (1963), reproduced in
F. Trelease, Cases and Materials on Natural Resources 359-360 (1965).
7. Butler v. United States, 297 U.S. 1 (1935).
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tion and interstate commerce upheld the need for a uniform administration through central control.8
Natural resources as an economic commodity which merited the
federal interest assumed importance when Congress passed the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1890,' to which it affixed an act passed in 1886
regulating the dumping of refuse into the New York Harbor.' 0 Federal interest in natural resources was theretofore restricted primarily
to federal land grants; however, the Rivers and Harbors Act indicated
an active assumption of authority by the central government in order
to protect its functions and duties in navigation and commerce. In
1899, the Act was further amended to give the Secretary of the
Army power to regulate the discharges of wastes of any kind into
navigable bodies of water of the United States.'
The federal judiciary upheld the authority of the central government over natural resources. In the case of Rio Grande Dam and
Irrigation Co. v. United States,' 2 which concerned an irrigation
project in the non-navigable upper reaches of the Rio Grande in New
Mexico, the Court stated, "The power of the state to authorize the
appropriation of water is limited by the superior power of the General Government to secure the uninterrupted navigation of all
navigable streams within the limits of the United States."' '
Canada, however, is engulfed in a constitutional revision that must
cope with vast cultural and political difficulties and presents a different picture of federal polititical and economic development.
The British North America Act (BNA), which established the
Dominion of Canada as an entity in 1867,14 assumed that the legislative branches, Parliament and the provincial legislatures, are supreme
and have powers which, "cover the whole area of self-government
within the whole area of Canada."' s Thus, prohibitions on legislative
supremacy are limited by the Constitution to the federal and bicultural nature of the government.
Judicial review, premised on the concept of judicial supremacy,
8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
9. 33 U.S.C.A. § 401 etseq. (1957).
10. Act of Aug. 5, 1886, ch. 929, § 1, 24 Stat. 329; Act of May 24, 1824, ch. 140, § 1,
4 Stat. 32 had authorized the first river improvement bill and the first harbor improvement
bill. According to William and Robert Hull, The Origin and Development of the Waterways
Policy of the United States 62, n. 93 (1967) the bills were combined by Congress in 1826
and amended from time to time thereafter.
11. Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part IIL The
FederalEffort, 52 Iowa L.R. 799, 803 (1967).
12. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
13. Id. at 708.
14. 30 and 31 Vict., ch. 3.
15. B. Strayer, Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada 5 (1968).
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has had a limited growth in the constitutional development of
Canada. Furthermore, the Canadian Supreme Court assumed its role
as the final arbiter of the nature of government only in 1949 when
appeal from Canadian courts to the Privy Council of Great Britain
was abolished. The Court's position in Canada is not yet clear
although a move towards the concept and practice of "constitutional
revisionism" popular in the jurisprudence of the United States is
discernible. Since the Canadian Supreme Court, in contrast to the
United States Supreme Court, may only review the division of
powers between the federal and provincial governments and not the
existence or exercise of that power, whatever strength the Court
develops will probably stem from its interpretation of the division of
powers. This will particularly affect water resources in Canada which,
again in contrast to the Uhited States,. are controlled equally by
Parliament and the provinces. If the decision of Ottawa Valley Power
Company v. Hydro-Electric Power Commission' 6 is any indication,
the Court will certainly affirm the co-equal authority of the two
governments over water resources. In that case Justice Masters wrote
for the majority, "The Legislature cannot destroy, usurp, or derogate
from substantive rights over which it has, by the Canadian constitution, no jurisdiction and then protect its action in that regard by
enacting that no action can be brought in the Courts of the Province
to inquire into the validity of its legislation, thus indirectly destroying the division of powers set forth in the British North America
Act."' 7
The division of constitutional powers in Canada, insofar as natural
resources are concerned, presents unsettled questions about the jurisdictional authority of Parliament and provincial governments. There
is no comprehensive federal legislation, comparable to the United
States Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and Parliamentary enactments have been directed toward such piecemeal efforts as navigation, shipping, fisheries, and migratory birds.' 8 Research and cooperation on the national government level are becoming extensive;
however, corrprehensive enactments have not emerged from this
growing federal interest.' 9
16. 1937 4 D.L.R. 594 (Ont. Ct. App.), reversing, 1936 3 D.L.R. 468 (Ont. High Ct.).
17. Id. at 603.
18. Navigation Waters Protection Act, Rev. Stat. Can. ch. 41, (1952); Canada Shipping
Act, Rev. Stat. Can. ch. 29 (1952), as amended by Stats. Can. ch. 34 § 25 (Vol. 2 1956);
Fisheries Act, Rev. Stat. Can. ch. 119 (1952); Migratory Birds Convention Act, Rev. Stat.
Can. ch. 179 (1952). See also The Participation of the Government of Canada in the
Investigation & Abatement of Water Pollution, in National Conference on Pollution and Our
Environment (1966).
19. Jordan, Recent Developments in InternationalEnvironmentalPollution Control, 15
McGill L.R. 279, 294-95 (1969).
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The Columbia Basin controversy between British Columbia and
the central government highlighted this continuing debate over jurisdictional authority in the natural resources area. 2" The imbroglio
arose out of a proposed treaty adjusting a long-continuing and
volatile dispute between the United States and Canada involving the
diversion of the Columbia River for hydro-electric power. 2 At the
same time the treaty was being considered, the provincial government of British Columbia was negotiating with Kaiser Aluminum
Company for construction of the Arrow Lakes Dam. 2 2 This was
possible because, although the central government maintains jurisdiction over certain uses of natural resources such as navigable streams,
international waters, and interprovincial waters,' 3 the Canadian
provinces hold ownership over the natural resources situated within
their borders. 2 4 In practice, however, hydro-electric development
has been left up to the provinces, rather than, as in the United States,
to the central government.
The central government of Canada exercised its constitutional
treaty-making powers in negotiating the Columbia River Treaty with
the United States; however, the ability of the central government to
implement a treaty involving matters within provincial jurisdiction
depends on provincial cooperation. Treaties in Canada are not, as in
the United States, viewed as co-equal to federal legislation and
superior to state law; nor is it clear that treaty-making is the exclusive domain of the central government. When the central government attempted to block the Kaiser negotiations, the province of
British Columbia turned the tables by bringing the major power companies in the province under governmental control. This move forced
the central government to accept provincial demands in exchange for
cooperation in the implementation of the Treaty. At this point, total
central control by the central government was suggested as a possible
sanction, but prior Canadian practice and the political consequences
of usurping provincial authority made this an infeasible alternative.
International negotiation in the United States is clearly within the
exclusive control of the central government. The U.S. Constitution
limits treaty making power, under Article II, Section 2, to the Executive branch of the government. The President ". . . shall have power,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties,
20. See Bourne, The Columbia River Controversy, 37 Can. Bar Rev. 444 (1959) for a
detailed account.
21. See R. Johnson, Law of International Drainage Basins 167 (1967).
22. Id. at 224.
23. British North American Act, 1867, 31-33 Vict. 3, § 92, 11(c).
24. Id. at § § 92 (10), (13), (16).

NA TURA L RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." ' 2 s The system
contemplates that responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs
rests with the Executive; however, the representative nature of the
government and the system of checks and balances necessitate final
approval of a treaty by Congress.
A treaty under United States Constitutional practice has the force
and effect of law. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean
that treaties, as is true with statutes, repeal existing legislation which
is repugnant to the newly passed enactment. However, this also
means that, insofar as its domestic effect is concerned, a later statute
of the federal legislative branch will repeal an earlier treaty. This does
not affect the United States' International obligations under the
treaty. A state is still responsible under international law for its
treaty obligations on the basis of the contractual nature of the agreement which cannot be renounced unilaterally. 6
The legislative branch exercises an even greater amount of control
over the conduct of foreign affairs through its appropriations powers.
Article I, Section 7, of the United States' Constitution provides that
all revenue bills shall originate in the House of Representatives and
that the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in other
bills. Section 8 enumerates the powers of Congress, and Congress
may undertake any necessary activity affecting the conduct of
foreign relations such as the regulation of foreign commerce and
foreign coin; the imposition of duties on imported goods; the definition and punishment of felonies committed on the high seas and
offenses against the law of nations; and the declaration of war.2 7
Therefore, the conduct of international relations is a joint enterprise
between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government.
The picture insofar as federal-state relations in foreign affairs is
quite different in the United States than it is in Canada. Article I,
Section 10, expressly prohibits the states from entering into any
25. U.S. Const. art. 1l, § 2.
26. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Cases), 130 U.S. 581 (1889);
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases) 112 U.S.
580 (1884); Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ § 138, 140, 141, 145; see also The Montigo (United States v. Columbia), Moore, International Arbitrations 1439 (1896) in which the international obligations of the defaulting
state were upheld and the Case of the Polish Nationals in Danzig, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B,
No. 44 in which the Permanent Court of International Justice states "a state cannot rely, as
against another state, on the provisions of the latter's constitution, but only on international
law and obligations duly accepted, and conversely, a state cannot adduce against another
state its own constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under
international law or treaties in force."
27. See Hendry and Bishop, Treaties and Federal Constitutions (1955).
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treaty, alliance, or confederation. States are further prevented, without the consent of Congress, from placing imposts or duties on imports or exports. And finally, states may not, without the consent of
Congress, enter into agreements or compacts with other states or
foreign po wers. There is established, constitutionally, a direct federal
control over 2all interstate relations and over state relations with
foreign states. 8
Federal statutes and treaties are coequal; state statutes, whether
enacted earlier or later than a federal treaty are superseded by a
conflicting treaty. Article VI, section 2 of the Constitution states,
"The Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be
made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding." The "Supremacy Clause" of the Constitution has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court as establishing on the federal
level complete control through statutory and treaty enactments over
interstate and international affairs of the United States.2 9
THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM

Although the internal positions of the United States and Canada
on federalism and natural resources may be accurately described,
their international position in the field of international boundaries
and water resources is less than clear. In the first place, no accepted
international law doctrines exist in this area. In the second place,
both countries, in their relations with each other, have alternatively
evoked or denied the effect of principles of absolute sovereignty
according to the particular problem at hand. In a word, practice has
not followed pronouncement, and it is interesting to note the divergence between practiced and "announced" policies of Canada and the
United States pertaining to their international drainage basins.
International law distinguishes between successive and contiguous
28. See Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A stdy_ in
Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685 (1925) for a definitive study of the use of the
compact in interstate and federal-state relations. Justice Frankfurter proved to much more
friendly to federal encroachment on state's rights in this area than he was in the battle over
the Erie Doctrine.
29. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), "... acts of Congress are the Supreme
law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared
to be so when made under the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether
the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the
convention." Whether this implies a greater treaty-making power than statute-making power
has never been judicially answered; however, the fact that a later statute supersedes an
earlier treaty would tend to militate against such an interpretation.
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waters flowing within the territory of two or more states. Successive
waters are those over which one state has complete physical control
while the water passes through its territory. Contiguous waters are
boundary waters over which there is a dual physical control. 0 The
distinction is recognized in practice but it is not one enunciated in
case or treaty law. United States and Canadian relations as to shared
waters resources in international rivers are based on express international agreements which have served to define the rights and duties
of the Parties. International law recognizes the fact that sovereign
states may vary international rules in their dealings with each
other;3 1 moreover, international rules on multistate waters are not
yet settled. States have set forth four theories on the use of multistate waters in their international dealings: territorial integrity; absolute territorial sovereignty; limited territorial sovereignty; and community of co-riparian rights. Absolute territorial sovereignty is now
considered to be inconpatible with international obligagenerally
3
tions. 2
The history of the negotiations over the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 and the subsequent relationship of the Parties make it unclear whether either country has, in practice, assumed absolute
sovereignty over rivers (successive or contiguous) shared by both
countries. However, the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 expressly
reserves the right of the Parties to the exclusive jurisdiction over
successive waters within their own territory. 3 ' This reservation presumably implements the position of absolute territorial sovereignty
announced by U.S. Attorney General Harmon in 1895. 3 4
It is interesting to note, however, that, not only has the Harmon
Doctrine 3 I never been applied by Canada or the United States, but
also the Doctrine was soundly repudiated in 1958 in a United States'
State Department legal memorandum attacking its presentation by
30. Oppenheim, International Law 484485 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1948); C. Hyde,
International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 443449 (1947).
31. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of International Rivers, art. I: "The general rules of
international law as set forth in these chapters are applicable to the use of the water of
international drainage basin except as may be provided otherwise by convention, agreement
or binding custom among the basin states." The comment provides that under international
law, states may enter into agreements with respect to any matter unless in conflict with
basic standards of conduct accepted by the international community. A. Garretson, The
Law of International Drainage Basins 779 (1967).
32. Id. at 18, n. 67.
33. Art. II provides "Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself... the exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion . . . of all waters on its own side of
the line which in the natural channels would flow across the boundary or to boundary
waters. .. "
34. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1895).
35. Id.
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Canada in the Columbia River controversy."6 Moreover, the
Supreme Court decisions of the United States in interstate water
controversies have announced the validity of the doctrine of equitable apportionment and user 3 7 which is compatible with limited
territorial sovereignty. If consistent international practice by the
United States is good evidence, then the United States accepts the
theory of limited territorial sovereignty. A state may use waters
within its oven territory if its use does not unreasonably interfere
with the rights of other states.
Although Canada has not been in a position to develop a strong
position in this area, it would accept a similar limitation on its
sovereign prerogatives if the discussion and debate surrounding the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 is any indication. The use by
Canada of the absolute territorial sovereignty concept in the
Columbia River controversy has been characterized by most
commentators as a ploy to force the United States into a more
generous position vis-a-vis shared power resources.3 8 Finally, the
needs and interests of Canada make it impractical to do other than
espouse a position of limited territorial sovereignty which would
assure an apportionment of benefits and a recourse for injuries
caused by unreasonable use. Therefore, although the general
international situation as to rights and duties in contiguous and
successive rivers is still in a formative state, there are rules of practice
existing between the United States and Canada.
THE PEMBINA RIVER BASIN
Joint administration of our shared resources will require extensive
political and judicial machinery. Development of the Pembina River
Basin is just one area of our shared resources where a joint enterprise
is needed, and the model administrative and judicial provisions
proposed in this study could be used in a single project or across the
board. Recent IJC investigations state that joint development of
the Basin is not only possible but also essential.
The Pembina River Basin is located 80 miles southwest of
36. Ceriffin, Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of International Waters, S. Doc. No.
118, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
37. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S.
660 (1931).
38. See R. Johnson, supra note 21 at 234-238, who suggests that the use of the Harmon
Doctrine by Canada in supporting its right to divert the Columbia River as an upstream
riparian was a tactical device to force the United States into acceding to its demands to
provide power to Canada in return for storage facilities and an agreement not to divert the
Columbia River Basin waters except for irrigation, domestic and industrial uses. Treaty with
Canada relating to the Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia
River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961, 2 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
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Winnipeg, Manitoba, and 160 miles north of Bismarck, North
Dakota, and lies on both sides of the international boundary between
the Red River of the North and in Canada and flows southeasterly
through Manitoba into North Dakota, then for 110 miles to its
mouth on the Red River, two miles south of the international
boundary.3 Erratic climate that produced severe drought conditions
during the 1930's and as late as 1961 also brings spring floods. The
average annual precipitation is 18 inches; however, snowfall averages
38 inches annually and is approximately 21 percent of total
precipitation. This results in a maximum stream flow in March and
April following the spring snow melt." Flood damage is a major
problem in the Basin area. The 1950 floods caused an estimated
projected damage of over four million dollars on both sides of the
border and added to the magnitude and duration of the Red River
floods, bringing the total damage to over thirteen million dollars. 4 '
The economic picture of the Basin is highly colored by its lack of
dependable water supply.4 2 Economically, the areas affected by the
Pembina include a total population of 63,000 including 38,000
residents of Manitoba and 25,000 in North Dakota. It is densely
settled in the urban areas of Langdon, Walhalla, and Cavalier, North
Dakota; Morden, Winkler, Altona, Killarney, and Bolssevan,
Manitoba, and thinly populated in the rural areas.4 3 Fertile soil is
the most valuable resource of the Basin; the area from Wahalla to the
Red River, on both sides of the border, is reported as one of the best
agricultural areas in both the United States and Canada. Major crops
include wheat, oats, barley, hay, flax, rye, sunflower seed, potatoes,
sugar beets, and vegetables; and climatic conditions plus intensive use
of land allow the growing of specialty crops. 4"
Industry, however, has been reluctant to locate in the area because
of unreliable water supplies from the Pembina. The ground water
supply is severely limited and contains iron, sulphates, and dissolved
solids in quantities that exceed accepted drinking water needs. The
International Joint Commission (IJC) Report states that estimated
municipal and industrial water needs from the Pembina River within
the next forty years will be 0.6 million U.S. gallons per day in the
United States and 3.4 million U.S. gallons per day in Canada; such is
not feasible under present conditions. The water quality of the
39. International Joint Commission, Cooperative Development of the Pembina River
Basin 5 (1967).
40. Id. at 6-7.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id. at 12.
43. Id. at 8.
44. Id.
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Pembina River is particularly poor at low flow, and supplemental
flow is needed to dilute waste effluents and compensate for channel
losses, particularly in the reaches of the river below Wahalla, North
Dakota. 4 s
The economy of the area is aided by a good rail transportation
system and a network of primary and secondary highways for commercial trucking. The agricultural economy supplies the food
processing industry, which forms the major industrial component of
the area. However, agriculture is dependent upon the risks produced
by marginal and variable rainfall and suffers from an inadequacy of
moisture supplies during the growing season. 4 6
Recreation is vastly undeveloped in the area. Lack of facilities and
heavy algae growths have contributed to the poor conditions. Game
fishing suffers from an inability to support food supplies for a yearround fish population. 4
In summary, the area in question offers
land use potential of great economic worth to both the United States
and Canada because of its agricultural and population features. However, under present conditions, which exist primarily because of
water control problems, the area cannot be developed into its
potential worth. Both countries have studied the possibilities of unilateral, multi-purpose developments for flood control, water supply
or irrigation and have concluded that unilateral programs would not
be economically justifiable in either country.
In 1962 the Governments of Canada and the United States requested the IJC to investigate and report on possible programs of
cooperative development of the Pembina River Basin which would be
practical, economically feasible, and mutually advantageous to the
two countries. The report, as issued, included plans for water apportionment and cost sharing, and the development envisaged
domestic water supply and sanitation, control of floods, irrigation,
and other beneficial uses. 4 8
THE PEMBINA RIVER BASIN REPORT:
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The basic considerations listed by the Report of the IJC on the
Cooperative Development of the Pembina River Basin in October
1967 as follows: (I) each country should realize greater net benefits
than it would acting unilaterally; (2) total direct costs borne by each
country should not exceed total net benefits received by the coun45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

11-12.
12.
13.
2.
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try; (3) cooperative development should recognize all multi-purpose
aspects; (4) a fair share of all necessary works and operational responsibility should be located in each country so that each country

shares and benefits from the expenditures of construction funds in
its territory and has physical control of an integral part of the
project; and (5) a flexible approach to the plan of cooperative development should be used that would permit each country to use its
share of the waters as it sees fit, so long as there is no interference

with the other country's use of its share. 4 9
It was noted that the alternative of unilateral development by
either or both countries had been considered. Canada might build a

high dam at the Pembina site or the United States could build a low
dam site at Pemblier. However, the report concludes that, in both
instances, the possibilities of increased utilization of benefits and
resources would be limited and, furthermore, prior unilateral studies
had shown such plans to be economically unjustifiable."0 A cost-

benefit survey 5 was projected in order to calculate the economic
justification of any cooperative development. The report states that,
rather than secondary or intangible benefits, primary or direct benefits were used in determining economic advantage. Specific costs and

benefits included such elements as wage rates, value of currency,
prices of materials, and interest rates which would be expended to
obtain irrigation, recreation, and water supply.' 2

The report took into account differences in values attached in
each country to flood protection, recreational facilities, and irrigation projects, weighing such factors as the size of irrigated farms and
rate of their development; the agricultural price structure and de49. Id. at 27.
50. Id. at 28.
51. See Maass, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions, 80
Q.J.Econ. 208 (1966); Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 Econ.J. 683 (1965) where the
authors state that cost-benefit analysis or investment planning is a practical way of assessing
the desirability of projects when the long view is important. It combines welfare economics,
public finance, resource economics, among others, and attempts to create a coherent unit. It
had its origins in federal activities in the improvement of navigation under thy Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1902, although the theory predates its usage in this field. The object is "to
maximize the present value of all benefits less that of all costs, subject to specific constraints." Id. at 686. There are many problems involved including the evaluation of benefits
which are not capable of being marketed such as the collective goods and services supplied
by the government. Id. at 695. Maass, however, states that cost-benefit analysis irrelevant to
public projects because it ranks projects only in terms of economic efficiency and does not
consider factors such as income redistribution. Maass at 209. He states that the concept of
"trade-offs" as a potential bargaining tool is not relevant in the distribution of natural
resources. The individual is far more motivated by his economic self-interest than by his
political community interests, and this is not a feasible criteria for the evaluation of public
projects. Maass at 213-218.
52. InternationalJoint Commission, supranote 39, at 28.
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mand for such goods in each country, as well as national policies of
price support and population settlement. By such an analysis, the
report structured its findings in terms of separable economic gains
which are listed under joint project works and supplemental works:
The multipurpose components of the plan of cooperative development which contribute to more than one benefit are referred to in
this report as the joint project works; the additional components of
the plan of development that are necessary for the realization of
only one specific benefit are referred to herein as supplemental
works; and the separable economic gain as used in this report is the
value of a specific benefit less the cost of5any supplemental works
necessary for the realization of that benefit. 3
Net benefits should be apportioned equitably between the United
States and Canada. To achieve this goal, "the ratio of the sum of the
separable economic gains to the cost of the joint project works,"
should be the same for both countries." ' The report suggests that in
the development of any joint project, all construction costs be paid
by the country where the works are located. Then an equalization of
costs and benefits to each country will be achieved by transferring
money from one country to cover a part of the cost of joint project
works in the other country.5 5
Apportionment of water was not part of the reference given to the
Commission. However, certain assumptions had to be made for the
purposes of the study, and an equal division of the available waters
was presumed in all of the proposals. It was noted that the project
need not utilize or control all the available waters. An agreement was
reached between representatives of Manitoba and North Dakota on
the investigation board that 12 percent of the total yield of the Basin
should be excluded for non-project purposes. 5 6 Apportionment, in
fact, although excluded from the terms of the reference, is a major
consideration in arriving at any feasible and acceptable plan of joint
development. As the report indicates, the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909 does not cover the problem of apportionment. In Article II it is
stated that each country has exclusive jurisdiction and control over
the use and diversion of all the upstream waters on its own side of
the boundary.' ' The Pembina River presents an unusual case in that
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.

57. International Joint Commission, Rules of Procedure and Text of Treaty art. II at 14
(1965).
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it crosses and recrosses the boundary; therefore, both countries are
upstream riparians. s I
This means that each country would have to limit the full exercise
of sovereign powers within its own territory.' I Although customary
international law does not provide an exact principle in this area, the
recent Helsinki Rules on the uses of international rivers are at least
good evidence of contemporary International practice.6 0 Under the
Helsinki Rules it is stated that every basin state is entitled to a
reasonable and equitable share which can only be determined by the
relevant factors of each case. Relevant factors include the consideration of the location of each state; past uses made of the waters; the
economic and social needs of the basin; the maximum benefit to all
basin states; and, of course, the amount of available water. 6' The
IJC report, therefore, cost-justified its recommendations on the basis
of equitable allocation arrived at by applying relevant considerations
and arrived at a measure of net advantage to each country through
the concept of separable economic gains. It was noted that, since
unilateral development had been considered to be economically unjustifiable, the net advantages of cooperative development were not
directly measurable. 6 2
Four plans were considered by the investigative board. Plan I
called for a single multi-purpose reservoir, Pemblier, to be located in
the United States. Plan II would have two reservoirs, the Pemblier in
the United States and the Pembina in Canada. Plan III was omitted
from discussion in the final report. Plan IV called for two reservoirs,
as did Plan IL; however, the Canadian reservoir would be at Swan
Lake. 6 3
Each plan was then costed in terms of component parts which
were directly assigned to specific purposes and joint-use costs,
allocable to flood control and recreation. In the former case, the
costs were divided between the two countries in proportion to an
assumed annual benefit which would be realized by each country. In
58. InternationalJoint Commission, supra note 39, at 21.
59. Although the "Harmon Doctrine" of absolute sovereignty has been discussed as the
basis of Art. I1 of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, it would appear that the concept of
"reasonable uses" in the Helsinki Rules is the present position of both governments. See R.
Johnson, The Columbia Basin, in The Law of International Drainage Basins 167 (Garretson,
Hayton, and Olmstead eds. (1967).
60. This is the conclusion of the International Joint Commission in The Report on the
Cooperative Development of the Pembina River Basin at 31.
61. See Helsinki Rules art. IV, in The Law of International River Basins, supra note 21,

at 782.
62. InternationalJoint Commission, supra note 39, at 31.
63. Id. at 22-23.
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the latter case the costs were equally divided on the assumption of
equal utilization by both countries. 6 4
After the formulation of the basic plans, the investigative board
held public hearings in both countries where private citizens, public
officials, municipalities, elected representatives, and federal officials
were present. The views of witnesses as to the acceptability of the
plans, plus additional information, were obtained and added to the
decision-making processes of the board. 6 I
Plan I1 for cooperative development, modified by the relevant data
obtained from the additional evidence offered by the public hearings
and discussions with both governments, won the approval of the IJC.
The report concludes that a cooperative effort in water resources
control and development in the Pembina River Basin is practicable,
economically feasible, and of mutual advantage to both the United
States and Canada. The plan would serve the needs of domestic water
supply and sanitation; flood control; irrigation; and other beneficial
uses. 6 6 The following benefits, at the very minimum, are projected
by the report: (1) elimination of the possibility of future flood
damage comparable to the disastrous floods of 1950; (2) creation of
a water supply which is certain and of suitable quality for municipal
and industrial purposes in seven Manitoba communities and three
North Dakota communities; (3) ability to irrigate approximately
20,000 acres in Manitoba and North Dakota; (4) availability of dilution waters for wastes discharged into the Pembina River from communities in North Dakota, which would improve the quality of the
waters in the lower reaches of the river; (5) availability of a waterrelated recreational site in Manitoba and of three such sites in North
Dakota; and (6) improvement of the amount and quality of game
fish in the Basin. 6 1 Possible apportionment schemes discussed previously as to the cost and water use are given in the conclusions of
the report.
The Pembina River Basin Report was issued in 1967. Cooperative
development now depends on whether the United States and Canada
will agree on a joint undertaking. If so, then a joint international
agency is needed to6 implement and supervise the proposed Pembina
River Basin Project.

8

Problems of joint administration in multi-authority situations do
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

23.
24-25.
33.
48-49.
50.
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not lie as much in the formulation of goals acceptable to all the
parties as in the creation of an ongoing authority that meets the
approval of each participant. The use of interstate compacts 6 I in the
United States has resolved many a controversy over claims to shared
resources through the device of continuing interstate cooperation. An
international compact is far more complex than an interstate compact; the partial solutions to the problems of shared resources
reached under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and subsequent
agreements emphasize the difficulties involved in implementing plans
suggesting an impairment of national sovereignty. Further problems
involving local implementation of central solutions serve only to
further complicate the picture. 7 ° However, it is possible that the
present framework of the International Joint Commission offers a
feasible structure for an ongoing authority, capable of both implementing and administering a continuing water resources program.
A MODEL: THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION

The Commission is composed of three members from each
country, the United States and Canada." Under the terms of the
Boundary Waters Treaty, the Commission has the ability to appoint
technical committees, composed of members of both countries, to
72
investigate and report on references submitted by either country.
The Commission has jurisdictional authority over applications submitted under the Treaty for the uses, obstructions, or diversions of
boundary waters7 and has exercised this authority by creating onunits for the maintenance and control of approved
going supervisory
74
programs.
The Treaty of 1909" s lacks any provision for jurisdiction within the
Commission to adjudicate claims brought by one Party based upon
alleged injury by the other Party other than specific matters referred
to in Articles III, IV, and VIII. Article X does provide that the
Commission will act as an arbitral body in case a dispute is referred
6
to it by the mutual consent of the United States and Canada. 7
69. See E. Cleary, The Orsanco Story: Water Quality Management in the Ohio Valley
Under an Interstate Compact (1967); Leach and Sugg, The Administration of Interstate
Compacts (1959); Zimmerman and Wendell, The Interstate Compact Since 1925 (1951).
70. Grad, Federal State Compact: A New Experiment in Cooperative Federalism, 63
Colum.L.Rev. 825 (1963); Mackenzie, supra note 55.

71. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, art. VII.
72. Id. art. IX, part Ill.
73. Id. at art. VII.
74. Docket no. 68, St. Lawrence Power, Bloomfield and Fitzgerald, Boundary Water
Problems of Canada and the United States 199 (1958).

75. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.
76. Id. at art. X.
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Furthermore, Article II provides that the remedies available to local
citizens in the local courts of the country of the place of an injury
caused by interference with or diversions from their natural channels
of water on either side of the boundary will be available to the
injured party of the other country. 7 Judicial relief is to some extent
provided for in the present framework of the IJC. However, provisions must be made for expanded judicial powers, within the confines of the supervisory body designated to operate any water resources program.
A MODEL: INTERSTATE COMPACTS

Judicial powers are included in the interstate compacts operative
within the United States. It is, however, necessary to point out that
interstate compacts subsume the presence of a federal judiciary with
the ultimate power of enforcement. Therefore U.S. Supreme Court
decisions comparing the interstate situation to one in which the
Court sits as an international tribunal must be corrected to the extent that no ultimate power of enforcement other than world public
opinion now exists at the international level. 7 8 The most comprehensive compact operative in the U.S. is the Delaware River Basin
Commission. It includes the federal government as an integral part of
its administrative framework. 7 9 The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act in the 1965 and 1966 amendments paved the way for regional
development of water resources. 8"
The Delaware River Basin Compact was approved in 1961;" it
includes Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and the
federal government and creates a Delaware River Basin, including the
territory of each signatory state. The Commission possesses a wide
amount of administrative powers for the multi-purpose development
of the water resources for the benefit of local, state, and national
interests in the region. As previously stated, it is the first such compact with full federal participation. It has been reported that,
77. Id. at art. 11.
78. Austin, Canadian-U.S.Practice and Theory Respecting the InternationalLaw of InternationalRivers: A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 Can.
Bar Rev. 399, 432 (1959).
79. InternationalJoint Commission, supra note 39, at 104.
80. Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903; Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 provides "The Secretary shall, at the request of a governor of a
state, or a majority of governors when more than one state is involved, make a grant to pay
not to exceed 50 per centum of the administrative expenses of a planning agency for a
period not to exceed 3 years, if such agency provides for adequate representation of appropriate state, interstate, local, or (when appropriate) international interests in the basin or
portion thereof involved and is capable of developing an effective, comprehensive water
quality control and abatement plan for a basin." Id. § 3 c(1).
81. Act of Sept. 27, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688.
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"Operations of no fewer than nineteen federal, fourteen interstate,
and some forty-three state agencies were concerned to some degree
with the water resources of the basin and many more with the related natural resources of its 12,750 square mile area."" 2
The Delaware Compact was drafted and approved after several
years of study of the inadequacies of prior compacts and overlapping
federal and state agencies. It provides for a wide range of water
resources, pollution control, and watershed management activities,
and it states that no state shall undertake water development projects
unless approved by the commission as fitting into the comprehensive
program. The participation of the federal government comes into
play by its agreement to abide by the development plans, always
subject, of course, to the federal government's paramount right of
withdrawal or modification. 8 3 The provisions of the Delaware River
Basin Compact provide a viable working model for the establishment
of a like body operating on an international level between the United
States and Canada. Parallels can be drawn between the interstate and
federal-state relationships involved in the Delaware Compact and the
international and federal-relationships involved in the administration
of a joint water resources program between the United States and
Canada.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A summary of administrative provisions concludes the text of this
article. Hbwever, the major problem will be agreeing on the jurisdictional authority of the agency and on its judicial enforcement
powers. A special agreement in the nature of a treaty should be
included in the over-all agreement providing for the arbitration of
any claim submitted to the agency by either party. 8" The RiverBasin Agreement should provide that jurisdiction over any dispute
will lie in the place where the injury arises or in the place where the
injury occurs and that any person who is injured by an act or
omission arising out of the terms and conditions of the Agreement
may seek relief in the local or federal courts of either country, in the
same manner as inhabitants of that country. 8 s Special removal provisions to the federal courts like those in the Delaware River Basin
Compact should be included in the implementing legislation of each
country. This, of course, would be subject to Constitutional limita82. InternationalJoint Commission, supra note 42, at 825.
83. Delaware River Basin Compact, Act of Sept. 27, 1961, 75 Stat. 688 § § 11.1, 11.2,
1.4.
84. See § § 3.9 and 3.10, appendix infra.
85. This is in accord with art. II of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.
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tions.8 6 The procedures utilized under the Mexican-United States
Treaty of 1945 for the Rio Grande River providing that Commission
decisions are final unless protested within thirty days should be included in the Agreement. 8
Any dispute submitted for arbitration
by the Parties incapable of settlement should be submitted under
mutual agreement to an umpire chosen in accordance with the rules
of Article XLV (4), (5), and (6) of the Hague Convention for the
Settlement of International Disputes, 1907, whose decision should
be final. This is stipulated in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.88
The suggestions in this article show that existing institutions are
capable of providing the framework for solutions to our natural resources problems. Judicial enforcement and appeal are the major
areas of weakness now to be found within the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 and the International Joint Commission. Both administrative and judicial machinery are necessary for carrying out an
agreement and providing an avenue of fair hearing for any affected
person. This gap in the Treaty and Commission powers can be
remedied without a major change in the present federal and international structures operating in the United States and Canada.

86. Act of Sept. 27, 1961, 75 Stat. 688 § 15.1 Reservations (p) "The United States
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all cases or controversies arising under the
Compact, and this Act and any case or controversy so arising initiated in a state court shall
be removable to the appropriate United States district court in the manner provided by Sec.
1446, 28 U.S.C. Nothing contained in the Compact or elsewhere in this Act shall be
construed as a waiver by the United States of its immunity from suit."
87. Treaty with Mexico Respecting the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana
Rivers and of the Rio Grande, art. 25, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994.
88. Art. X, Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.
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APPENDIX
The following are selected provisions concerning administrative control and judicial review
which are recommended for inclusion in a cooperative development program for the United
States and Canada.'
Article I
Short Title, Definitions, Purpose and Limitations
Section 1.1 Short title. This Act shall be known and may be cited as the Cooperative River
Basin Development Agreement.2
1.2 Definitions. For the purposes of this agreement, and of any supplemental or concurring
legislation enacted pursuant thereto, except as may be otherwise required by the context:
(a) "Basin" shall mean the area of drainage hereinafter prescribed in this agreement.
(b) "Commission" shall mean the River Basin Commission created and constituted by
this agreement.
(c) "Advisory Board" shall mean each five member part of the River Basin Comnission,
one resident of the United States and one resident of Canada.
(d) "Signatory party" shall mean the United States or Canada.'
1.3 Purpose and Findings. The legislative bodies of the respective signatory parties hereby
find and declare:
(a) The water resources of the basin are affected with a local, provincial, state, regional,
national and international interest and their planning, conservation, utilization, development, management and control, under appropriate arrangements for intergovernmental cooperation, are public purposes of the respective signatory parties.
(b) The water resources of the basin are subject to the sovereign right and responsibility
of the signatory parties, and it is the purpose of this agreement to provide for a joint
exercise of such powers of sovereignty in the comnon interests of the people of the
region.
(c) The water resources of the basin are functionally interrelated, and the uses of these
resources are interdependent. A single administrative agency is therefore essential for
effective and econonical direction, supervision and coordination of efforts and programs of international, federal, state, provincial and local governents and of private
enterprise.
(d) In general, the purposes of this agreement are to promote international comity; to
remove causes of present and future controversy; to make secure and protect present
developments within the United States and Canada; to encourage and provide for the
planning, conservation, utilization; development, management and control of the
water resources of the basin; and to provide for cooperative
planning and action by
4
the signatory parties with respect to such water resources.
1.4 Existing Agencies; Construction. It is the purpose of the signatory parties to preserve
and utilize the functions, powers and duties of existing offices and agencies of government
to the extent not inconsistent with the agreement, and the commission is authorized and
1. The main provisions dealing with administrative powers have been adopted from the
Delaware River Basin Compact, Act of Sept. 27, 1961. Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75. Stat. 688.
Provisions for administrative control and judicial review have been adopted from Maloney,
Ausness and Morris. Model Water Code for Use in Riparian States, ch. I and 5, Not complete (unpublished paper in University of Florida Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as
Model Water Code] Reference has also been made to the Treaty with Mexico Respecting
Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and the Rio Grande, Feb. 23,
1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 and to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, Jan. 11,
1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548.
2. Delaware River Basin Compact, art. 1, § 1.1, Act of Sept. 27, 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-328, 75 Stat. 688.
3. Id.
4. Id. art. I, § 1.3.
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directed to utilize and employ such offices and agencies for the purpose of this agreement to
the fullest extent it finds feasible and advantageous.'
1.5 Duration of Agreement.
(a) The duration of this agreement shall be for an initial period of 100 years from its
effective date, and it shall be continued for additional periods of 100 years if not
later than 20 years nor sooner than 25 years prior to the determination of the initial
period or any succeeding period neither of the signatory parties, by authority of an
act of its legislature, notifies the commission of intention to terminate the agreement
at the end of the then current 100 year period. 6
Article II
Organization and Area
Section 2.1 Commission Created. The River Basin Commission is hereby created as a body
politic and corporate, with succession for the duration of this agreement,
as an agency and
7
instrumentality of the government of the respective signatory parties.
2.2 Commission Membership. (1) The River Basin Commission shall consist of ten full-time
members, appointed by the I.J.C., five members resident of Canada and five members
resident of the United States and called respectively the U.S. Advisory Board and the
Canadian Advisory Board. 8 (2) One member of each Advisory Board shall be a practitioner
of the law; one member shall be a hydrologist or a professional engineer with experience in
water management or conservation; one member shall be an experienced farmer or rancher;
and the other two members shall be chosen based upon their general education, business
qualifications and experience with problems relating to water resources."
2.3 Compensation. Members of the Advisory Board shall be compensated by their respective
governments and shall serve on the basis of five-year, renewable contracts.' o
2.4 Voting Power. Each member shall be entitled to one vote on all matters which may
come before the Advisory Boards or the River Basin Commission as a whole. No action shall
be taken at any meeting unless a majority of the membership is present and votes in favor
thereof.''
2.5 Organizationand Procedure.The River Basin Commission and each Advisory Board shall
provide for its own organization and procedure, and shall adopt rules and regulations governing its meetings and transactions, subject to the approval of the I.J.C. It shall organize
annually by the election of a chairman and a vice-chairman from among its members."2
2.6 Jurisdiction of the River Basin Commission. The Commission shall have, exercise and
discharge its functions, powers and duties within the limits of the basin, except that it may
in its discretion act outside the basin whenever such action may be necessary or convenient
to effectuate its powers or duties within the basin. The Commission shall exercise such
power outside the basin only upon the approval of the I.J.C. and the consent of the
signatory parties.' '
Article III
Powers and Duties of the Commission
Section 3.1 Purposeand Policy. The Commission shall develop and effectuate plans, policies
and projects relating to the water resources of the basin. It shall adopt and promote uniform
5. Id. § 1.5.
6. Id. § 1.6.
7. Id. art. II, § 2.1.
8. See International Joint Commission, Rules of Procedure and Text of Treaty part Ill,
§ 28(1) (1965).
9. Model Water Code, supra note 1, ch. 1, § 1.05(2).
10. Id. § 1.05(3).
11. Delaware River Basin Compact, art. 2, § 2.5, Act of Sept. 27, 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-328, 75 Stat. 688.
12. Id. § 2.6.
13. Id. art. 3, § 2.7.
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and coordinated policies for water conservation, control, use and management in the basin.
It shall encourage the planning, development and financing of water resources projects
according to such plans and policies." 4
3.2 Comprehensive Plan, Program and Budgets. The commission shall formulate and adopt:
(a) A comprehensive plan, after consultation ith water users and interested public
bodies, for the immediate and long range development and uses of the water resources of the basin;
(b) A water resources program, based upon the comprehensive plan, which shall include a
systematic presentation of the quantity and quality of water resources needs of the
area to be served for such reasonably foreseeable period as the commission may
determine, balanced by existing and proposed projects required to satisfy such needs,
including all public and private projects affecting the basin, together with a separate
statement of the projects proposed to be undertaken by the commission during such
period; and
(c) An annual current expense budget, and an annual capital budget consistent with the
water resources covering the commission's projects and facilities for the budget
period.'
3.3 General Powers. The Commission may:
(a) Plan, design, acquire, construct, reconstruct, complete, own, improve, extend, develop, operate and maintain any and all projects, facilities, properties, activities and
services, determined by the commission to be necessary, convenient or useful for the
purposes of this agreement;
(b) Establish standards of planning, design and operation of all projects and facilities in
the basin which affect its water resources, including without limitation thereto water
and waste treatment plants, stream and lake recreational facilities, trunk mains for
water distribution, local flood protection works, small watershed management programs, and ground water recharging operations;
(c) Conduct and sponsor research on water resources, their planning, use conservation,
management, development, control and protection, and the capacity, adaptability
and best utility of each facility thereof, and collect, compile, correlate, analyze,
report and interpret data on water resources and uses in the basin, including without
limitation thereto the relation of water to other resources, industrial water technology, ground water movement, relation between water price and water demand,
and general hydrological condition;
(d) Compile and coordinate systematic stream stage and ground water level forecasting
data, and publicize such information when and as needed for water uses, flood
warning, quality maintenance or other purposes;
(e) Conduct such special ground water investigation tests, and operations and conpile
such data relating thereto as may be required to formulate and administer the corn
prehensive plan;
(f) Prepare, publish and disseminate information and reports with respect to the water
problems of the basin and for the presentation of the needs, resources and policies of
the basin to executive and legislative branches of the signatory parties;
(g) Exercise such other and different powers as may be delegated to it by this agreement
or otherwise pursuant to law, and have and exercise powers or which may be reasonably implied therefrom. 6
3.4 Rates and Charges. The commission may from time to time after public notice and
hearing fix, alter and revise rates, rentals, charges and tolls and classifications thereof, for
the use of facilities which it may own or operate and for products and services rendered
thereby, without regulation or control by any department, office or agency of any signatory
party. 1 7
14. Id. art. 3, § 3.1.
15. Id. art. 3, § 3.2.
16. ld. § 3.6.
17. Id. § 3.7. This provision intends to provide the framework for the utilization of an
effluent charge plan to finance a part of the cost of the river basin development. A. Kneese,
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3.5 Referral and Review. No project having a substantial effect on the water resources of the
basin shall hereafter be undertaken by any person, corporation or governmental authority
unless it shall have been first submitted to and approved by the commission, subject to the
provisions of Section 3.4. The commission shall approve a project whenever it finds and
determines that such project would not substantially impair or conflict with the comprehensive plan and may modify and approve as modified, or may disapprove any such project
whenever it finds and determines that the project would substantially impair or conflict
with such plan. The commission shall provide by regulation for the procedure or submission,
review and consideration of projects, and for its determinations pursuant to this section.
Any determination of the commission hereunder shall be subject to judicial review in any
court of competent jurisdiction.' '
3.6 Coordination and Cooperation. The commission shall promote and aid the coordination
of the activities and programs of international, federal, state, provincial, municipal and
private agencies concerned with water resources administration in the basin. To this end, but
without limitation thereto, the commission may:
(a) Advise, consult, contract, financially assist, or otherwise cooperate with any and all
such agencies;
(b) Employ any other agency or instrumentality of either of the signatory parties or of
any political subdivision thereof, in the design, construction, operation and maintenance of structures, and the installation and management of river control systems, or
for any other purpose;
(c) Develop and adopt plans and specifications for particular water resources projects and
facilities which so far as consistent with the comprehensive plan incorporate any
separate plans of other public and private organizations operating in the basin, and
permit the decentralized administration thereof;
(d) Qualify as a sponsoring agency under any federal legislation heretofore enacted to
provide financial or other assistance for the planning, conservation, utilization, de9
velopment, management or control of water resources.'
3.7 Advisory Committees. The conmission may constitute and empower advisory committees, mhich may be comprised of representatives of the public and of international,
federal, state, provincial, county and municipal governments, water resources agencies,
2
water-using industries, water-interest groups, labor and agriculture. o
3.8 Finality of Commission Actions. The Commission shall submit for approval to the
signatory parties through the I.J.C. a bi-annual report of proposed budget expenditures,
operational procedures, and future expansion or change. All reports shall be deemed approved unless disapproved by either signatory party within thirty (30) days of submittal.
The Commission shall maintain a continuous working liaison with the I.J.C. through its
2
chairman and vice-chairman.
3.9 Lack of Agreement Between the Advisory Boards of the River Basin Commission. When
there is a failure to reach a decision because of lack of agreement between the United States
Water Quality Management by Regional Authorities in the Ruhr Area with Special Emphasis
on the Role of Cost Assessment, Dec. 27, 1962 (paper before the Regional Science Association), reproduced in Bower and Kneese, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology
and Institutions cir. 12 (1968), Cleary, Banks and Kneese, Development of a Water Quality
Management Programfor the Delaware River Basin 48-50 (1963).
18. Delaware River Basin Compact, art. 3, § 3.8, Act of Sept. 27, 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-328, 75 Stat. 688; see Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 3448,
T.S. No. 548.
19. Delaware River Basin Compact, art. 3, § 3.9, Act of Sept. 27, 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-328, 75 Stat. 688.
20. Id. § 3.10.
21. This provision is based upon Art. 25 of the Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, 59
Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994. Art. 25 provides that "Except where the specific approval of the
two governments is required by any provision of this Treaty, if one of the governments fails
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and Canadian Advisory Boards, two reports shall be submitted to the I.J.C. by the River
Basin Commission Chairman, with his findings and recommendations. 2 The I.J.C. shall
review the reports, findings and recommendations, and, in accordance with Article X of the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, shall render a final decision. 2 3
3.10 Lack of Agreement Between the Signatory Parties as to the Decisions of the River
Basin Commission. When there is a lack of agreement between the signatory parties as to a
decision of the River Basin Commission, it shall be referred to the I.J.C. in accordance with
Article X of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.' *
Article IV
Judicial Review
1.1 Adoption of Regulations by Advisory Boards.2 5
(1) The River Basin Commission shall, in implementing the cooperative river basin development plan agreed to by the signatory parties, formulate such regulations as are necessary
for the operation of the plan.
(2) Each Advisory Board shall adopt, promulgate, and enforce, within its respective jurisdiction, the regulations formulated by the River Basin Commission.
(3) Regulations affecting the public interest other than regulations relating to the internal
organization and operation of the Advisory Boards shall be adopted as follows:
(a) The proposed regulations shall be contained in a resolution adopted by the River
Basin Commission at a regular or called meeting and included in the minutes of its
proceedings.
(b) Within ten days of the adoption of such resolution, notice of the regulation in the
form of a summary thereof (or in full, at the discretion of the River Basin Commission) shall be published. This notice shall fix the time and place for public hearings in both the United States and Canada before the River Basin Commission to be
held not less than ten days from the date of publication.
(c) Opportunity shall be afforded interested persons to present their views at such
public hearings either orally or in writing, or both, at the discretion of the River Basin
Commission. Objections may be raised to both the nature and form of such regulations. Following such hearings the River Basin Commission may amend, revise, or
to communicate to the Commission its approval or disapproval of a decision of the
Commission within thirty days reckoned from the date of the minute in which it shall have
been pronounced, the minute in question and the decisions which it contains shall be
considered to be approved by that government."
22. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, art. IX, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548
provides that "in case of disagreement the minority may make a joint report to both
Governments, or separate reports shall be made by the Commissioners on each side of their
own Government." Art. 25(d) of the Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters
of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219,
T.S. No. 994 provides that the Commission will settle disputes between the two Sections
(which are comparable to the Bounds) and that disputes which cannot be settled should be
referred to higher diplomatic channels.
23. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, art. X, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548
provides for the Commission to act as an arbiter of disputes between the United States and
Canada or their respective inhabitants. This provision, by special agreement, gives prior
consent to the submission of a dispute covered by the terms of the agreement.
24. Id., in the case of a disagreement between the two governments, rather than the
Boards, then the procedures of art. X would be followed and the consent of the
Governments would be required. In such a case, the precatory language of art. 25 of the
Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers
and of the Rio Grande which states that decisions of the Commission not approved by the
Governments should be subject to further negotiation and higher diplomatic levels is
considered the more expedient method.
25. See Model Water Code, supra note 1, ch. 1, § 1.07.
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rescind the resolution, which action shall be set forth in minutes of its proceedings,
and by resolution adopt the regulation proposed or as amended, or revised, or may
determine that no regulation is necessary.
(d) Upon adoption of any regulation as provided, copies thereof shall be submitted to
the signatory parties through the I.J.C. The regulation will be deemed approved
unless disapproved by either signatory party within thirty (30) days.
(e) Upon approval by the signatory parties by the demise of thirty (30) days, the respective Advisory Boards shall announce the promulgation of the regulation by publication and by filing with the appropriate governmental agencies. The regulation
shall become effective fifteen days after such notice.
(f) Regulations relating to the internal organization or management of the River Basin
Commission not affecting the public interest, shall be adopted by resolution recorded
in the minutes of its proceedings and shall become effective immediately upon submitting copies thereof to the signatory parties through the I.J.C. 2 6
1.2 Enforcement Proceedings Before the Advisory Boards
(1) All proceedings before the respective Advisory Boards concerning the enforcement of
any regulation adopted pursuant to the provisions of this agreement, or the issuance,
modification, or revocation of any permit or license given by the respective Advisory
Boards, shall be conducted in accordance with this provision.
(2) Parties affected by action of the respective Advisory Boards shall be timely informed of
the time, place, and nature of any hearing; the legal authority and jurisdiction under
which the hearing is to be held; and the matters of law and fact asserted. In fixing the
time and place for hearings, due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of
the parties or their representatives.
(3) Each Advisory Board is within its jurisdiction, authorized to administer oaths to witnesses, make findings of fact and determinations of law, and otherwise regulate the
course of the hearing.
(4) (a) Each Advisory Board, within its own jurisdiction, may require the production of
books, papers, or other documents and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance
and testimony of witnesses.
(b) If any person shall refuse to obey any subpoena as issued or shall refuse to testify
or produce any books, papers, or other documents required by the subpoena, the
Advisory Board may apply by proper petition to a court of competent jurisdiction
to require such person to obey unless such person shows sufficient cause for failing
to obey said subpoena.
(5) (a) Each Advisory Board or any party to a proceeding before it may cause the deposition of witnesses, residing within or without the jurisdictions of the Advisory
Boards in the manner prescribed by law for depositions in civil actions in that
jurisdiction.
(b) A full and accurate record of proceedings before the Advisory Board shall be taken
and shall constitute the sole record for purposes of judicial review.
(6) The Advisory Board shall not be bound by the technical rules of evidence but may
exclude irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. Parties to the hearing
shall have the right to present their case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to
cross-examine, and to submit rebuttal.
(7) The Advisory Board is authorized to hold conferences for the purposes of consolidating
applications for a hearing, selecting dates for a hearing satisfactory to the parties,
exploring all feasible methods to eliminate surprise and delay and to shorten the hearing, including arrangements for the parties in advance of the hearing to exchange
26. See also International Joint Commission, supra note 8, part 1II, 26.1 et seq., which
prescribes the official method of notice, publication, and conduct of a hearing under art. IX
of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. The procedure outlined above is substantially in
compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the International Joint Commission and has been
broadened only to include a wider scope of activities. Therefore, part 111, § 28 of the rules,
which provides for the appointment of advisory boards has been expanded to cover new
functions and duties.
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written qualifications of professional expert witnesses, and maps, charts, engineering
analyses and other items contemplated for introduction as evidence and to encourage
stipulations among the parties directed toward the same or similar ends.'
(a) Each Advisory Board shall appoint an water-ombudsman who shall serve in an
independent advisory capacity in any hearing or pre-hearing procedures before the
Board.
(b) The water-ombudsman shall be selected by the respective Advisory Board Chairman, with the approval of the River Basin Commission Chairman, to serve for a
term of five years on a renewable contract basis.
(c) The water-ombudsman shall be selected for his qualifications as a water hydrologist
or a professional engineer with experience in water management or conservation in
the jurisdiction of the respective Advisory Board.
(d) The water-ombudsman will serve in an on-going capacity as a liaison between the
Advisory Board and the other governmental agencies and private individuals or
organizations within the river basin jurisdiction of the Advisory Board to bring to
the attention of the Advisory Board the problems and needs of the community as a
whole with respect to the Advisory Board's duties and powers.
(e) The water-ombudsman may preside over any proceeding under this section before
the Advisory Board, and subject to final approval by the Advisory Board, exercise
28
in its name any and all of the powers enumerated in this section.
Judicial Review of Regulations and Orders.
(a) Any affected party may obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity, meaning, or
application of any regulation of an Advisory Board by bringing an action for declaratory judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) In addition to any other ground which may exist, any regulation of an Advisory
Board may be declared invalid, in whole or in part, for a substantial failure to
comply with the provisions of this section.
Any party to a proceeding before an Advisory Board aggrieved by a final order in any
proceeding before an Advisory Board under this section may seek judicial review in a
court of competent jurisdiction within the respective jurisdiction2 of the Advisory Board
within the time and manner prescribed by the rules of that court. 9

27. Model Water Code, supra note 1, ch. 1, § 1.10; see also International Joint
Commission, supra note 8, part lI-Applications, § § 12.1-25, part Ill-References,
§ § 26.1-30.
28. The term "ombudsman" is here used to reflect the role of the person as a mediator
between the citizen and the government. See Patterson, The Ombudsman, 1 U. of Brit.
Colum. L. Rev. 777 (1963) on the possibility of the ombudsman in the Canadian system; W.
Getihorn, Ombudsman and Others (1966) for a general survey of the use of ombudsmen.
29. Model Water Code, supra note 1, ch. 1, § 1.11.

